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BREAKING THE EQUILIBRIUM: 
FROM DISTRUST OF REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT TO AN AUTHORITARIAN EXECUTIVE 
Gábor Attila Tóth† 
Abstract: Although contemporary populist authoritarians have not entirely 
abandoned the aims and methods of their ancestors, authoritarianism has been undergoing 
a reinvention in recent years. Behind a façade of constitutionalism, new authoritarianism 
claims to abide by democratic principles. Populist authoritarians legitimize themselves 
through popular elections and maintain the entire set of formal institutions associated with 
constitutional democracy, using them as both an appearance of representation and a tool of 
authoritarian imposition.  
The article focuses on the concepts of trust and distrust of representative government to 
afford a better understanding of populist authoritarianism. The paper describes two rival 
theoretical conceptions of government, known as Hobbesian (sovereign government) and 
Lockean (limited government). The Hobbesian conception rests on the idea of an effective 
and efficient executive that is able to protect the safety of the people and avoid anarchy. In 
contrast, the Lockean tradition requires checks and balances in the constitutional design in 
order to prevent the rise of a tyrannical executive. In the former conception, trust in the 
authority is a substitute for constitutional constraints, whereas in the latter, constitutional 
limitations presuppose that public officials and institutions should be distrusted.  
The article argues that constitutionalism is better served when the characterizing traits of 
the two theories are balanced. A comparison of some of the elements of modern 
constitutionalism supports the idea that under certain circumstances, a relatively stable 
equilibrium between trustful constitutional cooperation and constitutional mechanisms of 
distrust can be achieved. However, the executive may gain unrestrained power when a 
constitutional system loses this balance. The article shows how a divergence from 
equilibrium can be a marker of populist authoritarianism. 
Cite as: Gábor Attila Tóth, Breaking the Equilibrium: From Distrust of Representative 
Government to an Authoritarian Executive, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 317 (2019). 
I. THE RISE OF POPULIST AUTHORITARIANISM 
In the twenty-first century, more than half of the countries in the world 
are far from what we would consider “normal” constitutional democracies.1 
                                                 
†  Alexander von Humboldt Senior Fellow at Humboldt University in Berlin. Versions of this paper 
were presented at the workshops Illiberal Democracy? Poland in Comparative, European Perspective, St. 
Antony's College, University of Oxford; Constitutionalism, Dissent, and Resistance, Humboldt University 
and Princeton University, Berlin; and Resurgence of Executive Primary in the Age of Populism, Academia 
Sinica, Taipei. The author thanks participants in those intensive discussions for insightful comments and 
suggestions. 
1  See Michael J. Abramowitz, Freedom in the World Report 2018: Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM 
HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) 
(creating categories—rule of law, electoral process, political participation, form of government, fundamental 
rights, civil society—evaluated as separate entities. The results are weighted according to the importance of 
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Outdated dictatorships still exist and so do war-torn countries or failed states 
like Syria or Yemen. Old-fashioned dictatorships can be characterized by a 
single-party system or a complete ban on political parties, the use of terror, 
censorship, and a strong mobilizing ideology. Such systems, e.g., North 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, or, to some extent, China, are exceptional today. 
In the majority of autocracies, leaders gain power peacefully and 
legitimize themselves through popular elections and referendums. Regular 
multiparty elections are held, and elected officials make laws in a legislative 
body. Controlling constitutional institutions remain formally in place. Blatant 
human rights violations, explicit prohibitions and outright censorship are 
relatively rare, as other more subtle techniques are used to effectively entrench 
power, dominate and intimidate political opposition and secure victory in 
future elections.2 This is the main reason why such antidemocratic systems 
are more difficult to discover and identify properly. The pattern repeats itself 
worldwide. In contrast with the earlier waves of democratization that spread 
across the globe, more recent trends have led to the disintegration of 
democracies. Not only Russia (probably the first regime of this kind) and 
Turkey, but also Hungary and Poland (two European Union Member States), 
and many other countries epitomize this phenomenon. The countries in 
question adopt—apparently in a democratic manner—a legal setting that 
moves them ever further from, rather than toward, democratic principles. 
                                                 
the different categories; rates are then aggregated; and, finally, the status of the country—free, partly free, 
not free—is calculated according to a combined average of the ratings); Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Transformation Index, TRANSFORMATION INDEX BTI, https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2018) (applying a similar methodology in its analysis and evaluation – whether and how developing 
countries, and countries in transition, are steering social change toward democracy. As a result of an 
aggregated rating process, the countries may receive one of the following statuses: democracy in 
consolidation, defective democracy, highly defective democracy, moderate autocracy, or hardline autocracy). 
See also Worldwide Governance Indicators Project, WORLD BANK, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (reporting on countries for 
different dimensions, e.g., rule of law, accountability, and control of corruption. The Cato Institute’s Human 
Freedom Index presents the state of human freedom in the world based on a broad measure that encompasses 
personal, civil, and economic freedom); The Human Freedom Index, CATO INSTITUTE, 
https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). See, e.g., Dalibor Rohac, Hungary 
and Poland Aren’t Democratic. They’re Authoritarian, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/05/hungary-and-poland-arent-democratic-theyre-authoritarian/ (showing 
a scholarly use of rating indexes) (Rohac argues that Central Europe’s anti-establishment rebels are 
increasingly authoritarian, and their geopolitical allegiances are to Moscow, not the West). 
2  See Gábor Attila Tóth, Authoritarianism, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Rainer Grote et al. eds. 2017), http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-
mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e205 (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (the approach of this article is slightly different from 
my Authoritarianism). See also Gábor Attila Tóth, Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism, 11 HAGUE J. 
ON RULE L. (forthcoming 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-018-0081-6. 
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Countries ranging from Azerbaijan to Venezuela demonstrate that when a 
populist executive gains concentrated power, a reshaped constitution may 
serve autocratic aspirations.3 As the Trump administration in the United States 
shows, even a country with a long pedigree of democratic traditions may not 
be entirely immune to the creep of authoritarian ideas and practices. Thus, 
anti-democratic tendencies affect not only the periphery of democracy, 
usually considered more vulnerable, but also the countries traditionally 
regarded as its core. 
The rise of authoritarianism has of course attracted considerable 
academic attention. The literature is vast, appearing across many disciplines 
from political science to comparative constitutional law. Beyond countless 
journal articles we mainly find edited volumes from constitutional, political 
science, or multidisciplinary perspectives.4 Political theorists and scholars of 
the history of political thought have produced important monographs.5 Apart 
from crucial collected volumes, 6  constitutional scholarship is engaged in 
country analyses, typically from a comparative perspective.7 
Scholars warn that the twenty-first century could become a century of 
authoritarianism as a result of the institutional erosion of democracy.8 There 
seems to be a consensus that, while the new regimes differ in some respects, 
they share key characteristics with their predecessors: aversion to principles 
of constitutional democracy, intolerance toward vulnerable minorities, and a 
flourishing oligarchy around the head of the regime.9 The new competitor to 
constitutional democracy has begun to take shape as self-proclaimed 
majoritarian in political form, nationalist in ideology, and capitalist in 
                                                 
3  David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521 (2018) (explaining how recent 
populist autocrats have either replaced existing constitutions entirely or adopted sweeping packages of 
amendments). 
4   See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes 1–20 (U. of 
Chicago, Public L. Working Paper No. 468, 2014); STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE 
AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010); WOLFGANG MERKEL, HANS-JÜRGEN 
PUHLE ET AL., DEFEKTE DEMOKRATIEN. BAND I: THEORIE (2003). 
5  See, e.g., MARINA OTTAWAY, DEMOCRACY CHALLENGED: THE RISE OF SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM 
(2003); ANDREAS SCHEDLER, THE POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY: SUSTAINING AND SUBVERTING ELECTORAL 
AUTHORITARIANISM (Laurence Whitehead ed. 2013); YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY 
OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER AND HOW TO SAVE IT (2018). 
6  See, e.g., MARK A. GRABER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (2018); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (2018). 
7  See, e.g., WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN: FREEFALL 2015-2018 
(2019); ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV, THE STRONG STATE IN RUSSIA: DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS (2014); ANDRÁS 
L. PAP, DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN HUNGARY: LAW AND SOCIETY IN AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018). 
8  AUTHORITARIANISM GOES GLOBAL: THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 
2016).  
9   See infra notes 12–14. 
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economics (though the case of Venezuela shows that it can be socialist). 
Moreover, the ideas and practices of the emerging regimes in question are far 
from independent of each other, as demonstrated by the extensive use of 
phrases like “nationalist international” and “autocratic international.” Apart 
from the scholarly consensus on some characteristics, we may distinguish two 
widespread and influential approaches. 
The first approach places great emphasis on historical analogies. It 
claims that the current erosion of constitutionalism can be better understood 
if the transformation is compared to the interwar period and the rise of fascism 
in Europe and beyond. Among defining features, we can find political 
polarization in constitutional matters, xenophobic nationalism as a means of 
mobilizing ideology, rejection of international cooperation, restrictive 
immigration policies, stigmatized “enemies of the people,” and arbitrary use 
of emergency powers. 10  The philosopher Jason Stanley points out the 
similarities among ultranationalist autocratic regimes by giving extensive 
examples of how they use for their purposes, among others, mythical past, 
fears, corruption, and economic inequality.11 The former U.S. Secretary of 
State, Madeleine Albright, suggests that we should examine the careers of 
Hitler and Mussolini if we want to understand Chávez, Erdogan, Orbán, and 
Putin.12 Timothy Snyder’s work goes further, offering new insights into the 
historical roots of today’s autocracies.13 
The objective of the second approach, in contrast, is to highlight the 
original quality of the transformation. Its main argument is that contemporary 
autocrats use the very constitutional institutions of democracy to transform it 
into a kind of despotism. What is happening today is the self-destruction of 
liberal democracy through democratic procedures and the rule of law. In this 
way, the second approach underscores the significant difference between the 
interwar democratic decline and the current transformation. One good 
example of this approach is a book by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt.14 
Although they offer many lessons from modern history that reveal the 
“rhymes of history,” the authors argue that democracy is dying in an 
                                                 
10  Notably, the Jacobins used at the outset the phrase “enemy of the people” against anybody who 
opposed them and codified crimes punishable by death. In the twentieth century, both the Bolsheviks and the 
Nazis returned to the term serving as a label meaning death.  
11  JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM (2018). 
12  MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING (2018). 
13  TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA (2018). 
14  STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018). 
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unprecedented way: peacefully, slowly, legally. 15  Kim Lane Scheppele’s 
works belong to the best constitutional accounts of the approach that seeks 
original features. She labels it “autocratic legalism,” when electoral mandates 
combined with legal change push through an illiberal agenda. 16  In her 
account, the new system is illiberal, anti-constitutionalist, and autocratic, but 
meets the criteria of legality and democracy at least in a formal way. 17 
Scheppele has dubbed this phenomenon the “Frankenstate,” in which 
legalistic autocrats selectively choose and stitch together the worst practices 
from liberal democracies to create something illiberal and monstrous.18 We 
may add that this approach shows—in quasi-Hegelian terms—how 
accumulated quantitative changes can lead to a qualitative change.19 
Each approach has its outstanding merits. I think, however, that it 
would be a grave error to simply treat contemporary authoritarianism as a 
revival of twentieth century autocracies. Clearly, we should learn from the 
lessons of history and understand the roots of new authoritarianism. Several 
cases demonstrate that contemporary populist authoritarians have not entirely 
abandoned the aims and methods of their ancestors. Yet, authoritarianism has 
reinvented itself in recent years. Its most salient new feature is that, behind a 
façade of constitutionalism, it claims to abide by democratic principles. 
The second approach, while contributing to the understanding of 
legalistic techniques used by autocrats, still does not seem fully satisfactory 
either. It has its shortcomings: it emphasizes the similarities between 
constitutional democracies and modern autocracies in their democratic roots 
or legal institutions, while underplaying their fundamental differences. Nor 
does this approach distinguish between unavoidably imperfect institutions of 
constitutional democracies and eminently harmful authoritarian institutions. 
Many questions arise here: Do the people in emerging authoritarian states 
exercise their democratic voting rights? Can we uphold the claim that new 
autocrats take actions as a matter of form in a legal and democratic manner? 
Is the Russian State Duma a democratically elected body? Why do many 
political leaders from Turkey to Poland need constitutional justices, judges, 
                                                 
15  Id. at 7–9. 
16  Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 545–48 (2018).  
17  See Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, 
19 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 3, 11 (2017) (In this analysis, the authors put the rule of law 
backsliding into the center.). 
18  Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate, 26 GOVERNANCE 559, 559–62 (2013). 
19 GEORG FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 776–78 (1969) (the idea was introduced by 
Aristotle and Heraclitus, developed by Hegel, and reformulated by Engels). 
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and public prosecutors who are ready to obey their authority? If we maintain 
that constitutional procedures and institutions are just a fig leaf designed to 
show democratic legitimacy and to cover something else, we should 
understand what is being covered up, and how.  
I think we cannot insist that the new autocratic rise is formally legal and 
democratic. I argued elsewhere that—contrary to the popular view—new 
authoritarianism is undemocratic and illegal development whose mechanisms 
can be understood better as pretenses of democracy. 20  We can better 
distinguish today’s authoritarianism from its predecessors if we understand 
the new mechanisms that create the pretense of democracy. Pretense here 
means essentially that the new type of system behaves as if it were a 
constitutional democracy; as if it gave preference to democratic values, 
principles and institutions. 21  Authoritarianism claims, first, that it has 
obtained democratic authorization from the majority of the people, and 
second, that it is respecting the formal rules of democracy. In my view, both 
claims are false. 
In the next chapter, I will outline the defining elements of populist 
authoritarianism.22 Then, I will bring the concepts of trust and distrust of 
representative government into focus. My aim is to show the importance of 
both trustful constitutional cooperation and mechanisms of distrust in 
constitutionalism. Populist authoritarian executives break this balance and 
gain unrestrained power. The divergence from equilibrium can be a marker of 
populist authoritarianism. 
                                                 
20  Tóth, supra note 2. 
21  A crucial conceptual difficulty here is that in some significant respects, there are considerable 
overlaps between the constitutional mechanisms of advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes. For 
example, attacking the independent judiciary; manipulating electoral rules so as to favor one party; curtailing 
civil liberties and freedom of the press; and introducing arbitrary emergency measures cannot be simply seen 
as indicators of an authoritarian government because those practices exist in functioning constitutional 
democracies, too. I believe, however, that there is a meaningful difference between authoritarian pretense of 
democracy and imperfection of functioning constitutional democracies. Authoritarian pretense of democracy 
is calculated, systematic and institutionalized as to its democratic functioning and credentials, but also in 
terms of the way it constructs and articulates the rule of law. In functioning democracies, in contrast, what 
one may call pretense is either sporadic or an activity of key political players, but far from a consistent 
strategy of constitutional institutions orchestrated by a political leader. That kind of shortcomings in a 
constitutional democracy can be considered as unavoidable imperfection or, in more serious cases, signs of 
authoritarian tendencies. 
22  For earlier versions of my account on defining elements of populist authoritarianism, see Tóth, 
Constitutional Markers of Authoritarianism, supra note 2, n.3; see also GÁBOR ATTILA TÓTH, F.L. JUST. & 
SOC’Y, THE AUTHORITARIAN’S NEW CLOTHES: TENDENCIES AWAY FROM CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
(2015). 
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This piece limits itself to a descriptive, comparative, and evaluative 
constitutional analysis. 23  However, it would be misleading to think that 
mechanisms of trust and distrust in constitutional transformation are purely 
legal or constitutional issues. Nevertheless, I can by no means hope to give an 
exhaustive explanation. I must specifically omit economic, socio-cultural, and 
psychological factors without which the causes, motives, and purposes can be 
understood to a limited extent only. 
II. DEFINING ELEMENTS OF POPULIST AUTHORITARIANISM 
A. Pseudo-Constitution 
The constitutional texts in authoritarian systems are often not 
fundamentally different from those found in constitutional democracies. The 
difficulty, however, is that authoritarian constitutions do not follow a regular 
pattern.24 In some countries, constitution making starts early. Some examples 
of this include the rapid adoptions of the constitutions of Venezuela and 
Ecuador, or the Hungarian Fundamental Law. 25 The case of Turkey is an 
example of an alternative method: the Constitution has been amended several 
times so as to change the system gradually and completely.26 In other cases, 
political practice rather than constitutional modification as such makes the 
difference. For instance, the 1993 Russian Constitution is not fundamentally 
different from the 1958 French Constitution whose presidential form of 
government it has adopted, yet it functions entirely differently. 27  In 
exceptional cases, nothing has changed at the constitutional level. In Poland, 
                                                 
23  Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 9 (2004) (I share the view that descriptive meaning of constitutional concepts “cannot be peeled off 
from evaluative force because the former depends on the latter in that way.”).  
24  ANDREW ARATO, THE ADVENTURES OF THE CONSTITUENT POWER BEYOND REVOLUTIONS? 76 
(2017) (offering a new paradigm on origins, methods and models of constitutional design).  
25  Kriszta Kovács & Gábor Attila Tóth, Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation, 7 EU. CONST. L. 
183, 197 (2011) (For example, the 2011 Hungarian Fundamental Law was adopted within two months. The 
draft text was released on March 14 and the Law was promulgated on April 25. The parliamentary agenda 
ensured five days for the plenary debate about the concept and four days about the details. That meant nine 
days from start to finish.). See also David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 
(2013), for a comparative perspective  
26  Ahmet Erdi Öztürk & İştar Gözaydın, Turkey’s Constitutional Amendments: A Critical Perspective, 
2 RES. & POL’Y ON TURK. 210 (2017). 
27  See TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA (2018) (De Gaulle 
and Yeltsin, the founding fathers of the two constitutions respectively, aimed to weaken the constitutional 
role of the parliaments and broaden the executive president’s competences. During the last six decades, the 
French constitutional system remained democratic, allowing fair and peaceful changes in executive power, 
whereas the Russian Constitution established an authoritarian rule. On the Russian system from a 
comparative and historical perspective.).  
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an authoritarian system in the making, the ruling party lacks a qualified 
majority; therefore, it cannot abolish the Constitution and adopt a new one in 
a way that conforms to the law. It can be said, however, that the Constitution 
of Poland is a dead letter or de facto invalid because it is disregarded 
systematically by ordinary laws.28 
Perhaps the only common feature of the authoritarian constitutions is 
that they do not serve as normative benchmarks. Loewenstein calls a 
“normative constitution” one that is real, living, effective, and enforced; one 
that “actually governs the dynamics of the power process instead of being 
governed by it.”29 In this sense, a normative constitution is the ultimate legal 
instrument of control on political processes. This concept is equivalent to 
Sartori’s “garantiste constitution,” which puts an obstacle in the way of 
arbitrary governmental power and ensures limited government. 30  Today, 
Dieter Grimm calls it an “achievement of constitutionalism” when 
constitutions rule out any absolute or arbitrary power of man over man.31 
In contrast to the normative constitution, an authoritarian constitution 
today is a combination of a descriptive “map of political powers”32 and a 
“façade” constitution.33 I call this a pseudo-constitution. As a predecessor of 
contemporary pseudo-constitutions, we may consider Loewenstein’s 
semantic constitution. It is a mere description of the governmental system; in 
the author’s words:  
[It] is nothing but the formalization of the existing location of 
political power for the exclusive benefit of the actual power 
holders. . . . Instead of serving for the limitation of political 
power, it has become the tool for the stabilization and 
perpetuation of the grip of the factual power holders on the 
community.34  
                                                 
28  Wojciech Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case-Study of Anti-Constitutional 
Populist Backsliding (U. Sydney L. Sch. Legal Stud. Research, Paper No. 18/01, 2018). 
29  KARL LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 148–49 (1957). 
30  Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 861 
(1962) (Garantiste constitutions are defined by Sartori as proper, congruent with the 19th century consensus, 
which limit arbitrary government power and ensure limited government.).  
31  DIETER GRIMM, DIE ZUKUNFT DER VERFASSUNG 31 (2002); Dieter Grimm, Types of Constitutions, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 104 (2012).  
32  ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6 (1998).   
33  Sartori, supra note 30, at 861. 
34  LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 149–50. 
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The semantic constitution is, thus, not an honest instrument but a means 
by which an autocratic government disguises its true character. Lowenstein 
saw the Constitution of the Soviet Union as a clear case of semantic 
constitution.35 
Sartori identifies another type of fake constitution, which he calls 
“façade constitution.” It appears to be a true constitution, compatible with the 
values and principles of normative constitutionalism, from checks and 
balances to multi-party elections. However, these principles “are disregarded 
at least in their essential garantiste features.” As far as liberty and equality 
rights are concerned, they are dead letter.36 
In the pseudo-constitutions of contemporary authoritarianism, there is 
a significant overlap between components of semantic and façade 
constitutions. They are partly descriptive and partly sham. Consider the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary. On the one hand, it describes the existing 
representative, executive, and judicial institutions, and gives information 
about the state’s non-secular commitment and anti-asylum-seeker attitude.37 
On the other, it basically presents a façade by proclaiming that the state is 
democratic under the rule of law, that the government respects human rights, 
and that no one’s activities shall be aimed at the exclusive possession of 
power.38 
Authoritarians adopt pseudo-constitutions because today the 
constitution is globally approved as a pattern of legitimation. However, the 
text of a pseudo-constitution is typically inconclusive because some parts are 
effective in a descriptive sense only, while others are systematically 
disregarded. In other words, such constitutions lack normative relevance 
                                                 
35 LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 29, at 150.   
36  Sartori, supra note 30, at 861. 
37  See Gábor Attila Tóth, Hungary, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EU MEMBER STATES 773–835 
(2014) (The Preamble (“National Avowal”) of the Fundamental Law was written in the spirit of the Catholic 
faith. This is what the reference to Saint Stephen and the Holy Crown (of St. Stephen) implies: “We are proud 
that one thousand years ago, our King Saint Stephen established the Hungarian State on solid foundations 
and led our country to become part of Christian Europe” and “we acknowledge the nation-preserving role of 
the Christian faith”. The National Avowal explicitly mentions “the Holy Crown, which embodies the 
constitutional continuity of the state and the unity of the nation” and the historical constitution. In this way 
the Fundamental Law not only recalls the historical role of Christianity in founding the Hungarian State, but 
expresses that present Hungarian constitutionalism is based upon the traditional Christian faith. In the 
Fundamental Law, the right to asylum is granted only “if neither their country of origin nor another country 
provides protection” for the asylum-seeker (Art. XIV(3)).).  
38  See GÁBOR ATTILA TÓTH, CONSTITUTION FOR A DISUNITED NATION: ON HUNGARY’S 2011 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (2012), for a comprehensive critical analysis. 
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because all political power resides with the leader of the ruling party. For this 
reason, in order to understand how an authoritarian system is really governed, 
the actual practice must be examined, in addition to the constitutional text.39 
B. Hegemonic Voting Practices 
Today, many authoritarian systems constitutionally retain multiparty 
elections and provide scope for activities of opposition movements. What 
makes them distinctive is that the election is managed so as to deny opposition 
candidates a fair chance. Legal norms and practices ensure the dominance of 
the ruling party. The governing party may enjoy undue advantage because of 
partisan changes in election law, unequal suffrage, gerrymandering of 
electoral districts, restrictive campaign regulations, and biased media 
coverage that blurs the separation between political party and the state, thus 
preventing an independent assessment of the election (e.g., Hungary). 40 
Modification of voter identification and registration laws may result in de 
facto disenfranchisement (e.g., Zimbabwe under President Mugabe). Electoral 
laws may unfairly promote voting by the diaspora (e.g., Senegal), or hinder 
the voting ability of émigrés (e.g., Venezuela under Chavez).41 Even landslide 
victories for authoritarian leaders, or their parties, may be attributed to a range 
of tools at the disposal of incumbents, such as manipulation of the public by 
mass media (e.g., Russia) or strategic delays to scheduled elections (e.g., 
Lebanon).42 
Authoritarianism, apparently, implements a first-past-the-post voting 
method (the candidate with the most votes in the electoral district wins) or a 
                                                 
39  Andrew Arato & Gábor Attila Tóth, The Multifaceted Sovereign: Domestic and International Actors 
in Constitutional Regime Changes, in CONSTITUTIONAL ACCELERATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
BEYOND 73–96 (2018) (Arato and I argue that prior to the adoption of a constitution, international advisory 
and monitoring bodies legitimately take part in the national constitution-making procedure. After the 
adoption of a constitution, international courts may legitimately review the process of national constitution-
making and constitutional norms on the basis of universal human rights and constitutional standards.).  
40  LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 4; SCHEDLER, supra note 5, at 105–07. But see Toth, Constitutional 
Markers of Authoritarianism, supra note 2 (I think, however, that the “electoral authoritarianism” tag is 
misleading because the elections in the authoritarian regimes are far from free and fair.). 
41  Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1702 (2015). 
42  Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of 
Organized Social Media Manipulation, THE COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA PROJECT (2018), 
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybertroops2018/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (A new research has 
revealed the impact of strategies and techniques used by government cyber troops, and that their activities 
violate democratic norms. For example, Russia made significant efforts in 2016 and 2017 to disrupt elections 
around the world, and also political parties spread disinformation domestically. The growth of cyber troop 
activity from 2017 to 2018 has demonstrated that these strategies are circulating globally.).  
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hybrid voting system with predominant majoritarian elements, where not so 
much the results of the elections but rather legal norms and practices—that is, 
the system as a whole—guarantee the dominance of the ruling party.43 Thus, 
an authoritarian system appears to be a majoritarian one backed by the 
electorate, with authoritarian leaders claiming exclusive moral representation 
of the people. The rejection of political pluralism and fair deliberative 
procedures does not belong among the defensible conceptions of democracy. 
In short, democracy is where the authorities arrange elections; 
authoritarianism is where the authorities arrange the elections and the results. 
C. Weakening Institutional Checks 
Contemporary populist authoritarianism maintains the entire set of 
formal institutions associated with constitutional democracy,44 using them as 
both a façade of democratic representation and a tool of authoritarian 
imposition. 45  Although the constitutional structures of authoritarian states 
inevitably consist of the three main parts—the legislative, the executive, and 
the judicial branches of government—they are not based upon the principles 
of separation of powers. Some transforming systems reportedly replace the 
role of the constitutional judiciary with “parliamentary sovereignty” (e.g., 
Poland).46  In practice, constitutional and statutory regulations, as well as 
constitutional conventions, are “reformed” and result in politically expedient 
modifications to the constitutional courts’ personal composition (“court 
packing”), competences, and institutional and financial independence.47 By 
way of example, this is precisely how the Hungarian and the Polish 
Constitutional Courts were neutralized. 48  Decisions of the constitutional 
                                                 
43  See Venice Commission, Report on Electoral Systems: Overview of Available Solutions and 
Selection Criteria (EC) No. 250/2003 of Feb. 4, 2004.  
44   See JÁNOS KIS, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY ix–x (2003) (Democracy can be labelled as both 
“liberal” and “constitutional” democracy. The former term puts the emphasis on a set of values and principles: 
liberty, equality, autonomy, collective self-governance, equal participatory rights in political decision 
making. The latter term refers to institutional preferences: the constitution enjoys the highest rank both 
procedurally and substantially; free and fair elections are held periodically; elected representatives of the 
people make laws; and judiciary enforces civil liberties.).  
45  SCHEDLER, supra note 5, at 54–56. 
46  Wojciech Sadurski, Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a 
Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler, 11 HAGUE J. RULE L. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s4080 3-018-0078-1 (for the latest developments).  
47  David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 194 (2013); Mark Tushnet, 
Authoritarian Constitutionalism 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 426 (2015).  
48  Kriszta Kovács & Kim Lane Scheppele, The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary: Lessons from 
Hungary and Poland—and the European Union, 51 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD., 189, 189–200 
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justices, appointed according to the will of the authoritarian leader, may 
contribute to the reinforcement of the system. The only exception is 
Kyrgyzstan, where the Constitutional Court was abolished with the adoption 
of the Constitution of 2010, transferring some of its powers to the Supreme 
Court.49 
As the record of the Valery Zorkin-chaired Russian Constitutional 
Court demonstrates, altered but not abolished tribunals may serve as a tool of 
authoritarian imposition. Vladimir Putin deployed constitutional review to 
help centralize and consolidate his authoritarian power. 50  Moreover, 
authoritarians occasionally tolerate painful judgments to construct a façade of 
constitutionalism, provided that the judiciary does not threaten the core of 
authoritarian institutional design (as was the case with the judiciary in Egypt 
under President Mubarak).51 Invariably, the aim behind such constitutional 
changes is to safeguard and promote the interests of a particular political force 
without constitutional balances.52 
Populist authoritarian leaders often invoke the “will of the people” to 
undercut the role of the constitutional judiciary, the institutional safeguard to 
protect the rule of law and individual freedoms. Weaker legal ties mean, 
however, that it is not only the judiciary but also other democratic institutions 
that are undermined. It becomes possible to sidestep representative 
government if the popular will is not legally constructed or channeled, but 
rather the echo chamber of a dominant leader. Consequently, populist 
                                                 
(2018); see also Kriszta Kovács & Gábor Attila Tóth, Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation, EUR. 
CONST. L. REV. (2011), 183, 183–203 (2011) (discussing the first authoritarian steps in detail).  
49  Venice Commission, Opinion on the draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (EC) No. 582/2010 
of June 4, 2010, ¶¶ 57–59, 69. 
50  Valery Zorkin, “Буква и дух Конституции” [The letter and spirit of the constitution], Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, No. 7689 (226) Oct. 9, 2018, https://rg.ru/2018/10/09/zorkin-nedostatki-v-konstitucii-mozhno-
ustranit-tochechnymi-izmeneniiami.html (visited Nov. 8, 2018) (most recently, Valery Zorkin argued in a 
think piece in Russia’s official newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, for “drastic reforms” to the constitution. For 
the sake of pretense, he criticized the current text for having insufficient checks and balances. More 
importantly, he warned against “outmoded liberal models of democracy,” and advocated a “more effective 
model of popular rule” and “traditional values against globalization.” In Zorkin’s account, “the European 
Court of Human Rights is increasingly divorced from reality, imposing its position on countries and forcing 
people to defend themselves.).  
51  Varol, supra note 41, at 1691. 
52  Id. at 1689. 
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authoritarian leadership emerges at the expense of not only constitutional 
judiciary but also of parliamentarianism.53 
D. Superior Executive  
Structurally or in practice, constitutional powers are utterly unbalanced 
in these types of governments. The executive branch—especially the head of 
the executive: the president (e.g., Turkey and Russia), the prime minister (e.g., 
Hungary), the monarch (e.g., Saudi Arabia), or the de facto head of the 
government (e.g., Poland under Kaczynski)—is not only superior in power, 
but also enjoys unchecked power. Formal and actual power may differ 
significantly, as in Russia under the presidency of Medvedev, or formal 
governmental dominance may be subordinate to informal party dominance, as 
in Poland.54 
The constitutional struggle against authoritarianism, particularly in 
Africa and Latin America in recent decades, has often focused on the 
introduction of presidential term limits and the attempts of autocrats to have 
these term limits removed by constitutional reform or by reinterpretation of 
the term limit by the constitutional court (e.g., Peru). This scheme has been 
used in Burundi and Rwanda, where controversial third terms entrenched the 
position of the incumbent presidents.55 
Clearly, constitutional democracy may take various institutional forms. 
It may be a monarchy or a republic; it may have a presidential or a 
parliamentary system; it may be a federal or a unitary state. Nonetheless, 
comparative surveys of governmental systems reveal that some presidential 
                                                 
53  See in a theoretical context, JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 209–17 
(2000) (As another alternative to representative democracy, several earlier authoritarian forms of government 
preferred corporatism to competitive multiparty systems. Although authoritarianism has never availed itself 
exclusively of a corporatist model, and corporatism has never been exclusively an authoritarian attribute, 
non-democratic constitutional systems granting many cases a representative constitutional function to large 
interest groups such as business corporations, professional organizations, churches, or trade unions. A famous 
example of corporative structures is the Mussolini-regime.).  
54  Gábor Attila Tóth, Căi constituţionale spre autocraţie? Studii de caz privind situaţiile din Ungaria 
şi Polonia [Constitutional Roads to Autocracy? Case Studies from Hungary and Poland], 2 NOUA REVISTA 
DE DREPTURILE OMULUI [NEW REVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS] 3–15 (2016).  
55  Gábor Attila Tóth, Authoritarianism, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2017), http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e205 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2018) (in Burundi, according to a contra-textual interpretation of the Constitution, Art. 
96, in Rwanda, Art. 101 of the Constitution).  
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systems have difficulties sustaining democratic practices.56 Under a range of 
cultural and social conditions, a parliamentary system is more democratically 
robust than a presidential one. Depending on political traditions, culture, and 
the electoral system, the transformation of the executive and legislative 
branches into a presidential system may lead to authoritarianism, yet this is 
not necessarily always the case. To illustrate: although both the 1958 French 
and the 1993 Russian Constitutions were seen as reactions to parliamentary 
paralysis, with aspirations for a strong executive, French political and 
constitutional practice managed to maintain constitutional democracy over the 
long term; whereas, by contrast, since the relatively liberal beginnings of 
Yeltzin era Russia, the country has moved dramatically toward the 
authoritarian practices of the post-Glasnost era under Putin, although there 
have been minimal changes to the constitutional text itself.57 
An important stepping stone to authoritarianism seems to be broad or 
ill-defined powers, including emergency powers, of the executive, the 
“guardian of the Constitution.” In an advanced constitutional democracy, a 
state of emergency should provide only temporary conditions for exercising 
otherwise legitimate power. 58  A temporarily modified constitutional 
democracy means that some constitutional rights are restricted, but the main 
purpose of the state of emergency is to restore the democratic legal order and 
the full enjoyment of human rights.59 In a regime that seeks to distance itself 
from liberal democracy, the ruler’s declaration of a state of emergency serves 
to institutionalize an arbitrary executive power unhampered by legal 
constraints, thus creating a long-standing special power beyond the rule of 
law. As the constitutional developments in Turkey show, by referring to 
terrorist threats and other imminent dangers, the head of the executive can 
                                                 
56  JUAN J. LINZ, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CRISIS, BREAKDOWN AND 
REEQUILIBRATION. AN INTRODUCTION (1978); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & JASON M. LAKIN, THE 
DEMOCRATIC CENTURY 38–48 (2004).    
57  TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA (2018) (Snyder shows 
that President Putin follows ideas of Ivan Ilyin, a Russian philosopher who once imagined “Russian Christian 
fascism,” and borrowed ideas from Carl Schmitt (for example, politics is the art of identifying and 
neutralizing the enemy). Snyder argues that the constitutional system of the Russian Federation today 
resembles the Russian Empire of the late nineteen century. Both systems reject the rule of law as the principle 
of government. Law today is almost the same as “произво́л,” the arbitrary rule by autocratic tsars.).  
58  David Dyzenhaus, State of Emergency, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 442–61 (András Sajó & Michael Rosenfeld eds., 2012).  
59  Kriszta Kovács, The State of Exception: A Springtime for Schmittian Thoughts?, 17 DIRITTO E 
QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE 163, 179 (2017). 
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successfully initiate a wide-ranging constitutional amendment, leading to a 
sovereign-led authoritarian system.60 
E. Restriction of Fundamental Rights  
Many authoritarian constitutions formally declare fundamental rights 
for their citizens, but these are rarely legally enforceable. A common tactic is 
to construct a constitutional catalog of fundamental rights, ostensibly based 
upon the international standards arising from the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and regional human rights treaties. Yet, the 
constitution will, in fact, contain a number of sections in direct contradiction 
with international human rights law, typically recognizing certain 
fundamental rights only to the extent that these rights serve the interests of the 
ruling political group or class.  
Authoritarian leaders tend to restrict freedom of speech by de facto 
capturing an immense part of the mass media and by de jure takeover of public 
media. Although criminal prosecution is still a tool for authoritarianism (see 
Turkey), political leaders often opt for a less blunt approach. Instead they sue 
journalists and civil rights activists for defamation to silence dissent rather 
than resorting to imprisonment, blatant prohibitions, or the suppression of 
journals, books, films, or websites.61 Freedom of speech and of the press can 
be denied or restricted in the name of the ruling class, the dominant religion, 
or the protection of the head of state. It seems clear that, where restrictions on 
free speech protect the ruler in particular, or the executive in general, or indeed 
members of the majority (citing, for example, the dignity of the nation, 
country, or dominant ethnic group), instead of members of vulnerable social 
groups, such regulations constitute one aspect of an authoritarian approach. In 
this way, the general public is subject to systematic manipulation by the 
government. 
                                                 
60  See ANDREW ARATO, POST SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION MAKING: LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY 223–
68 (2016) (for a detailed analysis).  
61  Freedom of the Press 2017: Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon, FREEDOM HOUSE 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017 (last visited Dec. 23, 2018); Elana 
Beiser, 2018 World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/ranking (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2018); See Record Number of Journalists Jailed as Turkey, China, Egypt pay scant price for 
repression, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://cpj.org/reports/2017/12/journalists-prison-jail-record-number-turkey-china-egypt.php (on criminal 
prosecution in Turkey, China and Egypt).  
 
332 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 2 
 
Similarly, racial or ethnic exclusions, as well as repression of the civil 
society are among the characteristics of authoritarian constitutional systems. 
Although civil society organizations are rarely prohibited, many regimes from 
Algeria to Venezuela have adopted discriminatory, inflexible, and costly 
requirements for the registration and reporting of civil society groups. 62 
Likewise, “foreign agent” laws have been used as a tool of authoritarianism; 
their primary aim is to curb cooperation between international and domestic 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) (e.g., Belarus, Hungary, Israel, 
Russia). 63  Moreover, in many regimes, government-organized non-
governmental organizations (GONGOs) have been set up and/or financed by 
the executive in order to imitate civil society, promote authoritarian interests, 
and hamper the work of legitimate NGOs (e.g., Egypt, Hungary, Russia, 
Syria, Turkey).64 
F. Populism 
The decay of liberal democracy and the rise of authoritarianism are 
often associated with the spread of populism across the globe.65 Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, I think, populism—as a political concept, ideology, and 
worldwide tendency—is not only anti-elitist or anti-liberal, but also anti-
democratic.66 While many authoritarian systems appear to be majoritarian 
backed by the electorate through popular vote or referendum, they are likely 
based on one-sided modifications to the constitution and electoral laws, and 
subsequently, on unfair elections. By rejecting political pluralism, deliberative 
procedures of democracy, and institutional checks, populist leaders claim 
exclusive moral representation of “the people.” If a populist achieves the 
                                                 
62  Varol, supra note 41, at 1706–07, 1714–15 
63  See, e.g., European Commission for Democracy Through Law [Venice Commission], Opinion on 
Federal Law N. 121-FZ on Non-Commercial Organizations (“Law on Foreign Agents”), on Federal Laws 
N. 18-FZ and N. 147-FZ and on Federal Law N. 190-FZ on Making Amendments to the Criminal Code 
(“Law on Treason”) of the Russian Federation 13–14, 716-717/2013 (June 27, 2014) 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2014)025-e.     
64  See, e.g., Moises Naim, What is a GONGO: How Government-Sponsored Groups Masquerade as 
Civil Society?, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 13, 2009), https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/what-is-a-gongo/. 
65  JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 54–58 (2016); David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 521 (2018). 
66  William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J.  INT’L L. 193, 234 
(2012); Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGIES 493–512 (2013) (distinguishing democratic and antidemocratic populisms).  
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desired aim—a strong executive power, unhindered by legal constraints—the 
system will unavoidably become an authoritarian state.67 
III. TRUST AND DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT: THE HOBBESIAN AND LOCKEAN 
CONCEPTIONS 
We need to examine the mechanisms of trust and distrust of a 
representative government to obtain a better understanding of populist 
authoritarianism. Trust can be defined as the firm belief that someone or 
something is reliable, truthful, or possesses the means or skill to do 
something. 68  It is first and foremost an interpersonal and communal 
relationship, and much of human social life relies on it. We give our word to 
each other, we rely on each other’s word, and we expect others to behave in 
this and not another way. Most aspects of our social lives and interactions with 
individuals take the existence of trust for granted; without it, life would be 
difficult, if not inconceivable.69 Beyond trust in individuals, we may talk 
about trust in social structures and political institutions. The question arises 
whether political relations are or should be built on trust, too. One might argue 
that establishing constitutional institutions that grant individuals enforceable 
rights presupposes that we cannot trust each other. Similarly, once we 
establish constitutional institutions, there is no longer a need for trust.70 But 
this simple rejection does not seem satisfactory. The correlation between 
political institutions and trust is more complex. 
Modern constitutionalism can be described as a dichotomy of two rival 
theoretical conceptions of constitutional government. Protection against cruel, 
oppressive, and unreasonable use of governmental power is considered the 
core aim of constitutionalism. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
pointed out that the constitutional guarantees of limited governments are not 
                                                 
67  Jean Cohen, Populism and the Politics of Resentment, JUS COGEN: A CRITICAL JOURNAL OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND POLITICS (forthcoming 2019) (Jean Cohen argues, first, that when civil societies 
become deeply divided, and segmental pluralism maps onto party political polarization, social solidarity is 
imperiled, as is commitment to democratic norms, social justice and liberal constitutionalism; and second, 
that populist political entrepreneurs excel in fomenting social antagonisms by framing shifts in the forms of 
social pluralism in ways that foster deep political polarization, generalized distrust and a politics of 
resentment against “the establishment’” and “outsiders”).  
68  ADRIAAN T. PEPERZAK, Trustworthy Constitutions, in TRUST: WHO OR WHAT MIGHT SUPPORT US? 
54 (2013) (see constitutionalism in its Chapter “Trustworthy Constitutions?”). 
69  JONATHAN WOLFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 198 (3d ed. 2016).  
70  Id. 
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present to promote efficiency, but to prevent autocracy and arbitrary power.71 
However, a well-functioning legal system requires not only institutional limits 
of power, but also effectivity and efficiency. This two-fold character of 
constitutionalism goes back to the two rival traditions of constitutionalism 
originating from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
The Hobbesian conception, which is a historical predecessor of Locke’s 
views, rests on a powerful justificatory idea of sovereign government: an 
effective and efficient executive that is able to protect the safety of the people 
and avoid anarchy.72 In contrast, the Lockean tradition provides justification 
for a limited government.73 To Locke, the state of nature “is a condition in 
which the need or demand for rational trust hopelessly exceeds the available 
supply.”74 Checks and balances are required in the constitutional design in 
order to prevent the emergence of a tyrannical executive. In the Hobbesian 
conception, constitutional constraints are substituted by trust in the sovereign 
authority, whereas in the Lockean conception, constitutional limitations 
presuppose that public officials and institutions should be distrusted. Hobbes 
teaches us that too many checks may paralyze the government and lead to 
disintegration and anarchy, whereas Locke warns us that too much trust in 
public authorities may lead to an arbitrary government. In other words, we can 
learn from Hobbes why trust in effective civil government is needed, and from 
Locke why distrust is justified and, as a consequence, why it requires 
constitutional limits on the government. This is the core of the dichotomy 
between the Hobbesian and Lockean conceptions of constitutionalism. 
                                                 
71  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926); See Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles about the Rule 
of Law: Why, What, Where? and Who Cares, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 50, 78–81 (2011) (for reasons 
that arbitrary power is unacceptable).  
72  See DAVID DYZENHAUS AND THOMAS POOLE, HOBBES AND THE LAW (2012) (on Hobbes as a legal 
and constitutional thinker); See JOHN BOWIE, HOBBES AND HIS CRITICS: A STUDY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1952) (on the reception and varied readings of Hobbes’ political ideas by his 
contemporaries); See also Royce MacGillvray, Thomas Hobbes’s History of the English Civil War, 31 THE 
J. FOR THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179, 184–85 (1970); See, e.g., QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN 
LIBERTY (2008) (for the predominant interpretation of Hobbes); NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND 
THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION (Daniela Gobetti trans., 1993); Martin Loughlin, The Political Jurisprudence 
of Thomas Hobbes, in HOBBES AND THE LAW (2012); Id. at 5–21. 
73  See generally Jean-Fabien Spitz, Locke’s Contribution to the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CLASSICS: PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM 
FORTESCUE TO BENTHAM 152–68 (2014).  
74  John Dunn, What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke?, in 
INTERPRETING POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 9, 24 (1990).  
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The Lockean view often becomes influential during transitions from an 
authoritarian regime to democratic constitutionalism. 75  Roughly speaking, 
democratic opposition movements echo Locke’s view that human beings are 
“by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate 
and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent.”76 
Most seem to agree with the Lockean belief that, on the one hand, no one is 
born to rule or to be ruled and, on the other hand, that the right to life, liberty, 
and property belong to all. Some of the political players (conservative parties, 
religious groups with different political leanings) may follow the classical 
natural law theory by referring to God, while others, who do not share this 
religious view, appeal to equal dignity as the highest humanistic principle. 
Countries in democratic transition are not, of course, in a state of perfect 
freedom and equality. On the contrary, the political society has suffered under 
single-party political oppression. This is why the people seek an institutional 
order wherein the legislative and executive powers do not systematically 
violate, but rather maintain and promote, individual rights. Moreover, it is a 
common claim that legal disorder, namely the arbitrary administration and 
adjudication of law according to the demands of the ruling party, should be 
replaced by a legal system under the procedural and substantive guarantees of 
the rule of law. Locke, again, is found to be a teacher of the rule of law by a 
limited government: “[T]he legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to 
itself a power to rule by extemporary, arbitrary decrees, but is bound to 
dispense justice, and to decide the rights of the subject by promulgated, 
standing laws, and known authorized judges.”77 
As Locke, or Montesquieu, the other inventor of limited government, 
might have said, legitimate political institutions are meant to create certain 
foreseeable legal rules or to serve as checks upon abuses of law-making and 
law-enforcing authorities. 
The Hobbesian approach provides a powerful justificatory idea when a 
representative government is paralyzed.78 The cold civil war and the anarchy-
                                                 
75  See, e.g., JÁNOS KIS, L'ÉGALE DIGNITÉ: ESSAI SUR LES FONDEMENTS DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (1989) 
(another influential normative theory for democratic oppositions has its roots in Kantian philosophy).  
76  John Locke, The Second Treatise, of the Beginning of Political Sciences in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 141, § 95 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).  
77  Id. at 160, § 136.  
78  When the confrontation between the monarch and parliamentary obstruction increases inexorably, 
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like state (bellum omnium contra omnes) may revive a Hobbesian view of 
constitutionalism. Advocates of transition from constitutional democracy cite 
Hobbes: a strong central authority is needed in order to triumph over the evils 
of disorder.79 As Hobbes might have said, the governing person or body (the 
Sovereign) can be empowered by a social contract that will afford people a 
life other than what was available to them in the previous period. To ensure 
escape from legal disorder, people should renounce their rights and establish 
an effective law enforcement system headed by the Sovereign, which enforces 
whatever rules and restrictions it wishes. From a Hobbesian perspective, in 
populist authoritarian systems the parliamentary majority is led by a person in 
charge—the party leader, the president, or the prime minister—who is the 
highest legal power, a kind of Sovereign. Since the majority of voters have 
given this entity the authority to enact laws, everybody should obey the 
imposed regulations, regardless of disrespected individual interests or moral 
rights. 
Hobbes, in the manner of any magnificent thinker, is of course highly 
complex.80 Hobbes is not the precursor of totalitarianism. Nor is he a founding 
father of liberal constitutional democracy. It is true that we can find a path 
from Hobbes to liberal theorists and the modern rule of law.81 It is a way that 
leads, first, from a sovereign King to a sovereign Parliament, and then to a 
limited parliamentarianism, firmly established by Albert Dicey 82  and 
developing in the contemporary jurisprudence.83 However, the predominant 
view of Hobbes, as an interpretation by Carl Schmitt reveals,84 may go to 
                                                 
and political science identify a successor to this, the cold civil war, a cycle of escalating constitutional 
brinkmanship. See an explanation in DEBORAH BAUMGOLD, HOBBES’S POLITICAL THEORY 71 (1988).  
79  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 3 (John Charles Addison Gaskin ed., 1996). 
80  On the reception and varied readings of Hobbes’ political ideas, see John Bowie, Hobbes and His 
Critics: A Study in Seventeenth Century Constitutionalism, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 610, 610–12 (1952).  
81  David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes’s Constitutional Theory, in LEVIATHAN 452–80 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2010) 
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Poole, Hobbes on Law and Prerogative, in HOBBES AND THE LAW 68–96 (2012) (Thomas Poole examines 
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framework for social interaction) and his prerogative authority (deciding extra-legally what is best for the 
safety of his subjects). In Pool’s interpretation, that tension does not make Hobbes’s system unstable, but 
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82  ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 145–53 
(1982).  
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84  CARL SCHMITT, DER LEVIATHAN IN DER STAATSLEHRE DES THOMAS HOBBES: SINN UND 
FEHLSCHLAG EINES POLITISCHEN SYMBOLS (1995); MICHAEL J. OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION 
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extremes to justify an authoritarian or tyrannical legal system which prefers 
not only efficient but also arbitrary central government (see the “Sovereign 
Dictator”) to individual liberties.85 
IV. TRUST IN PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Traditionally, the foundation of the United Kingdom’s constitution is 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. For theorists such as Hobbes, 
Austin, and Dicey, it was assumed that constitutional authority derives from 
the people: the people are the source of sovereignty. The unlimited bearer of 
sovereignty is, however, the representative.86 In a constitutional sense, the 
people exist only in their representatives. In this model, the progress gradually 
leads from the Hobbesian theory of the sovereign king to the idea of organic 
unity (king-in-parliament), and later to the hegemony of the House of 
Commons (parliamentary sovereignty). 
Explaining the nature of parliamentary sovereignty, Dicey emphasizes: 
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more 
nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under 
the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by 
the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament.87  
The idea of checks and balances is inconsistent with the pervading 
principle of English constitutional law.88 The grotesque expression of Jean-
Louis de Lolme, an advocate of the constitutional form of balanced 
government and critic of the parliamentary supremacy, has become 
                                                 
85  STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 50 (1993) (Holmes argues that in his 
Leviathan, Schmitt pretends to be liberal); see also Johan Tralau, Introduction: Thomas Hobbes, Carl 
Schmitt, and three conceptions of politics, in THOMAS HOBBES AND CARL SCHMITT: THE POLITICS OF ORDER 
AND MYTH 3–14 (2011) (for a more critical perspective). 
86  John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, THE EXAMINE 497–98 (1995 ed. 1832). 
87  DICEY, supra note 82, at 87. 
88  MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPIRIT DES LOIS 162 (Gonzague Truce ed., 1961) (Famously, Montesquieu 
misunderstood on this point the English constitution. He thought that both the executive and the judicial 
branches were separated from the legislative body.); See also DICEY, supra note 82, at 211; See Laurence 
Claus, Montesquieu’s Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2005) 
(for a critical perspective).  
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proverbial: “Parliament can do everything but make a woman a man and a 
man a woman.”89 
In this model, constitutional conventions consisting of customs, 
practices, and maxims constitute limitations. 90  Conventions of the 
constitution are not recognized or enforced by the courts; instead, they make 
up a body of constitutional morality. By way of an example, a government 
minister who has lost the confidence of the House of Commons is obliged to 
resign. Similarly, the government can exercise its discretionary powers to take 
action without parliamentary approval. Both political morality and the force 
of public opinion (but not the courts) require that constitutional institutions 
obey conventional rules. To put it simply, the trust in the fairly-elected 
legislative body and the resilience of conventions lies at the center of this 
constitutional theory. The Parliament is entrusted with the power to make 
whatever laws it pleases.91 
However, the legally unlimited parliament is not the only foundation of 
English constitutionalism. Even Dicey acknowledges that sovereign power is 
bound by external and internal limits. “The external limit to the legal power 
of a sovereign consists in the possibility or certainty that his subjects, or a 
large number of them, will disobey or resist his laws.”92 It means that the 
authority, even that of a despot, depends upon willingness of his subjects to 
obey his instructions. The internal limit to the exercise of sovereignty arises 
from the nature of the sovereign power itself. It is limited from within, because 
the legislature is the product of a certain social condition and is determined by 
whatever defines the society that it governs. “If a legislature decided that all 
blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies 
would be illegal; but legislators must go mad before they could pass such a 
law, and subjects be idiotic before they could submit to it.”93 
More importantly, Dicey also argues that the supremacy of the rule of 
law also forms a fundamental principle of the constitution. This enunciation 
has three meanings. First, the absolute supremacy of regular law as opposed 
to the influence of arbitrary power. Second, equality before the law, or equal 
                                                 
89  JEAN-LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 132 (Oxford. J. of Legal Stud. ed., 1807).  
90  DICEY, supra note 82, at 244. 
91  WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 34 (Paul Smith ed., 2001) (Another classic author, 
Bagehot also gives an account on the respectful relationship between the queen and the cabinet.). 
92  DICEY, supra note 82, at 102–04. 
93  LESLIE STEPHEN, SCIENCE OF ETHICS 143 (2d ed. 2011). 
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subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the 
ordinary courts. Lastly, the rule of law mandates that the laws of the 
constitution are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, 
as defined and enforced by the courts.94 In this way, the rule of law empowers 
the courts to take part in determining the law of the constitution: the law can 
only include those rules which are recognized and enforced by the courts. 
Last but not least, it is well known that the constitutional architecture 
of the United Kingdom has undergone a considerable transformation in recent 
decades. An element of this transformation has been the adoption of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which incorporates the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) into U.K. law and promotes the enforcement of 
European human rights by the U.K. courts.95 Parliament is required by the 
HRA to take into account any relevant Strasbourg case law.96 The declaration 
of incompatibility by apex courts is considered as a crucial institutional 
mechanism in harmonizing the domestic legal system with the ECHR.97 As 
Lord Bingham put it in the case of R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, “while 
such case law is not strictly binding, it has been held that courts should, in the 
absence of some special circumstances, follow any clear and constant 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court.”98 In R (Jackson) v. Attorney General, 
Lord Hope argued that “Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, 
absolute. . . . Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the 
absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke 
and Blackstone is being qualified.” 99  More importantly, Lord Bingham 
mentioned that “checks and balances [are] inherent in the British 
constitution.”100 This process of transformation also involves reforms to the 
House of Lords, such as the abolition of judicial functions and the introduction 
of resignation, the establishment of an independent Supreme Court, which has 
                                                 
94  DICEY, supra note 82, at 145–53. 
95  Howard Davis, Human Rights Law Directions (4th ed. 2016). 
96  Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, 73 MODERN L. REV. 887 
(2010).  
97  R v. Horncastle & Others, [2009] UKSC 14, [10] (appeal taken from [2009] EWCA Crim. 9640, 
Eng.); see also Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. The United Kingdom, App. Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 2011) (Grand Chamber) (A declaration of incompatibility by a court means that a statute or part of a 
statute is incompatible with the ECHR. It does not invalidate the statue, but the government can use a rapid 
procedure to ensure that Parliament amends the statute.). 
98  R v. Special Adjudicator ex parte Ullah (FC) [2004] UKHL 26, [20] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
99  Jackson v. Her Majesty's Attorney General [2005] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 262, [104] (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
100  Id. at 41. 
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already produced extensive human rights case-law,101 and the expansion of 
democratic self-governing competences in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and 
Wales. These developments show that this model, based upon the Hobbesian 
interpretation of constitutionalism, borrows important elements from the 
Lockean tradition. 
Dicey’s constitutional ideas of parliamentary sovereignty have been 
subject to criticism in recent decades. Eric Barendt, reconsidering on the one 
hand the concept of parliamentary sovereignty and rule of law and, on the 
other, the new constitutional developments, has claimed that Dicey’s 
conceptions are misleading.102 I think Dicey would have argued that the rule 
of law, the de facto external and internal limits, and the constitutional 
conventions constitute instruments of balance between the trust in 
parliamentary supremacy and the distrust towards the government. Barendt 
and Lord Bingham would possibly reply that the equilibrium requires a 
thorough revision of the idea of parliamentary sovereignty. 
V. CHECKS AND BALANCES AS MEANS OF DISTRUST IN THE UNITED STATES 
The birth of U.S. constitutionalism can be described as a materialization 
of distrust towards the British government. The Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances enunciated that “his majesty’s’ liege subjects in these colonies are 
entitled to all the inherent rights and privileges of his natural born subjects” 
within the kingdom.103 Therefore, imposed taxes were seen as violations of 
the English constitution. Echoing the theories of Locke and Montesquieu, the 
Declaration of Independence went further by proclaiming that, to secure 
unalienable rights, “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed” and that “it is the right of the 
people to alter or to abolish the government” whenever it becomes destructive 
of these ends.104 
                                                 
101  See generally ANDREW LE SUEUR ET AL., BUILDING THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (1st ed. 2004); STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1st ed. 2013); Mark Tushnet, The Rise of Weak-Form 
Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321, 326 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 
2011). 
102  See BARENDT, supra note 32, at 88–89. See in more detail in ERIC BARENDT, DICEY AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (1985). See also Goldsworthy, supra note 78 (reinterpreting parliamentary sovereignty). 
103  Declaration of Rights and Grievances (1765). 
104  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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The distrust towards the government is based not only on bitter colonial 
resentment but also on a banal anthropological presupposition. As James 
Madison famously formulated in The Federalist Papers, No.  51: 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government which 
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies 
in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A 
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on 
the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity 
of auxiliary precautions.105  
This is the human condition which makes constitutional checks and 
balances imperative. Again, “ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition.”106 Constitutional devices to control the abuses of government are 
“reflections on human nature,” Madison writes, “but what is government 
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?”107 It is not an 
exaggeration to say that U.S. constitutionalism has typically identified with 
the Madisonian notion of limited government. Checks and balances, vertical 
and horizontal separation of powers, and even constitutional review, as 
evidenced in Marbury v. Madison,108  go back to the original idea of the 
founders. 
However, the one-time debate between the Federalists and 
Antifederalists reminds us that this model of constitutional architecture aims 
at a restrained but efficient government. The Federalists advocated in favor of 
a more efficient central government, while the Antifederalists distrusted 
federal power. Under the pen name Brutus, one of the authors of the 
Antifederalist Papers warned that a federal system headed by a president 
                                                 
105  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
106 Id. 
107  Id. 
108  [“T]he particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the 
principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is 
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (emphasis original); see also, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton).  
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might degenerate into despotism. Today it is important to remember Brutus’s 
point, quoting Montesquieu, that: 
[I]n a large [federal system], there are men of large fortunes, and 
consequently of less moderation; there are too great deposits to 
trust in the hands of a single subject; an ambitious person soon 
becomes sensible that he may be happy, great and glorious by 
oppressing his fellow citizens, and that he might raise himself to 
grandeur, on the ruins of his country.109 
Analyzing the debate, Hannah Arendt argues that what the founders of 
the federal American Constitution “were afraid of in practice was not power 
but impotence,” because of the history of defects and the paralysis of the 
Confederacy, as well as the belief of Montesquieu that republican government 
was effective only in relatively small territories. Accordingly, “the true 
objective of the Constitution was not to limit power but to create more power, 
actually to establish and duly constitute an entirely new power center, destined 
to compensate the confederate republic.”110 In sum, the inspiring principle of 
the U.S. Constitution was the dualism between liberty and efficiency; in other 
words, a strong yet still limited union. 
It is apparent that this constitutional model aims to prevent leaders from 
concentrating and abusing public power. Nonetheless, it would be a gross 
simplification to conclude that a public power limited by a written 
constitution, separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances are 
the only characteristics of U.S. constitutionalism. If there were only 
constitutional checks, an efficient federal government would be impossible.   
Similar to U.K. constitutionalism, this model also relies on unwritten 
constitutional conventions, often called “usages.”111 In their most recent book, 
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblat write that two conventions stand out as 
fundamental to the system: mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. 
The former refers to the idea that “as long as our rivals play by constitutional 
rules, we accept they have an equal right to exist, compete for power, and 
                                                 
109  George Clinton, Antifederalist No. 14, in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 37 (Morton Borden ed., 
1965) (1787).  
110  HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 153–54 (1990). 
111  Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1847–70 (2013).  
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govern.” 112  In short, political opponents are not enemies. Institutional 
forbearance is closely related to mutual toleration. It can be thought of as 
“avoiding actions that, while respecting the letter of the law, obviously violate 
its spirit.”113 The text of the Constitution does not prohibit that constitutional 
institutions use their competences to the hilt. A president could govern 
unilaterally by issuing executive orders, proclamations, and executive 
memoranda without the endorsement of Congress. A president could similarly 
bypass the judiciary by refusing to enforce court judgments or by extensive 
exercise of the power to issue a presidential pardon. The Senate could prevent 
presidents from appointing justices or members of the executive. Legislative 
minorities and even individual senators could obstruct legislation by 
indefinitely prolonging the debate. 114  Such unwritten conventions may 
prevent constitutional institutions and decision makers from reaching an 
impasse and causing a crisis. 
VI. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
Constitutionalism is better served when the elements of rival Hobbesian 
and Lockean theories are balanced. A comparison of the rival models of 
constitutionalism may support the idea that under certain circumstances, a 
relatively stable equilibrium can be maintained between constitutional 
cooperation and of the proclivity to distrust governments. Competition and 
fight for governmental power do not necessarily exclude mutual respect and 
partnership.115 
Nonetheless, scholars have long warned that democracy is in danger in 
the United States. This is a time when politics are polarized. 116  Many 
                                                 
112  LEVITSKY & ZIBLAT, supra note 14, at 102. 
113  LEVITSKY & ZIBLAT, supra note 14, at 106. 
114  See GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND 
SENATE (2010). 
115  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 26 1957, 2 BvG 309 
(361) (Ger) (For a comparison of vertical separation of powers, see the term Bundestreue designating a 
federal-friendly attitude in Germany. Both the federal governmental branches and the States are obliged to 
cooperate bona fide and contribute to the preservation of the interests of the Federation and its members.); 
see also Fabian Wittreck, Die Bundestreue, in 1 HANDBUCH FÖDERALISMUS (Ines Hartel ed.); GRUNDLAGEN 
DES FÖDERALISMUS UND DER DEUTSCHE BUNDESSTAAT 497–525 (2012); HARTMUT BAUER, DIE 
BUNDESTREUE, ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR DOGMATIK DES BUNDESSTAATSRECHTS UND ZUR 
RECHTSVERHÄLTNISLEHRE (1992) (providing a detailed analysis). 
116  Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 
(2008) (presenting an early diagnosis with suggestions for tackling this problem and identifying and 
defending core constitution principles (equal value of human life and personal autonomy as responsibility) 
that all citizens can and should share). 
 
344 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 2 
 
Americans distrust governmental institutions. 117  The established forms of 
toleration and institutional self-restraint are challenged.118 First, as a result of 
mutual distrust, constitutional checks have been used excessively and a 
number of longstanding conventions have been broken. Second, the following 
impasse has given rise to an authoritarian presidential administration with a 
tendency to disrespect constitutional checks and balances. 119  The United 
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union can be also seen as a clear 
sign of disintegration. It represents the distrust towards supranational 
institutions. The idea of preferring democracy on the domestic level to 
supranational development goes hand in hand with other proposed 
constitutional changes. Among the proposals, we find the repeal of the Human 
Rights Act, withdrawal from the ECHR, and a preference for appointed peers 
to elect representatives in the Parliament.120 These tendencies echo the then-
conventional and now-revitalized scholarly view that Parliament has the final 
say in matters of the constitution and human rights. It is far from evident that 
trust in a single constitutional body under the rule of a pure majority, no matter 
how deeply rooted, would serve the values and principles of constitutional 
democracy better than a pluralistic and cooperative approach to constitutional 
justice.121 
                                                 
117  For example, in the 1970s, about forty percent of American citizens had a “great deal/quite a lot” of 
trust in Congress; in recent years, this rate has dropped to about ten percent. Gallup, Confidence in 
Institutions, GALLUP (Nov. 8, 2018), http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx; see also 
Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lecture, 120 YALE L.J. 1999 (2011) (describing 
an early constitutional account).  
118  See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 
(2018) (providing a comparative perspective and arguing that prospects of liberal democracy depend less on 
institutions than on political leadership, popular resistance, and party politics). 
119  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2018) (laying out a 
deeper analysis of institutional pathologies) (modified from Bruce Ackerman, Tanner Lecture on Human 
Values, TANNER LECTURES (Nov. 8, 2018) https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-
z/a/Ackerman_10.pdf); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 6 (raising the provocative question, can it be a 
dictatorship in the United States?). 
120  See, e.g., CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK: THE CONSERVATIVES’ 
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGING BRITAIN’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS, 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/.../human_rights.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2018); EUROPEAN 
UNION COMMITTEE, THE UK, THE EU AND A BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS 2015, 2015–16, H.L. at 139, U.K., 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf.  
121  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS: THE NEW PUTNEY DEBATE (Denis J. Galligan ed., 2017) 
(collecting different views) (The UK constitutional transformation has of course attracted distinguished 
scholarly attention).  
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Many studies reveal that a gradual loss of trust in public institutions has 
occurred on an almost global scale over the past two- or three decades.122 In 
constitutional democracies, citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with their 
political institutions.123 In these times we are witnessing that the loss of trust 
in democratic representative government is contributing to the rise of populist 
authoritarianism. 
We need to look for the reasons behind this loss of trust; we can find 
them in several forms. Economic reasons are easy to find as economic 
prosperity causes public satisfaction, whereas economic decline erodes 
citizens’ trust in the government. In the European Union, new data shows that 
people who have suffered more from difficult economic times are more likely 
to have lost confidence in democratic governments and in the EU institutions. 
Distrust towards democratic institutions is at its worst in the economies that 
have struggled the most.124 The phenomenon, however, seems more complex. 
Perhaps it is better to say that severe financial and social shocks, such as bank 
crises, corruption, social injustice, social polarization, mismanagement of 
migration, and terrorist threats may contribute to widespread social distrust.125 
An important role has also been played by institutional factors ranging from 
unaccountable political leaders to structural shortcomings of the constitutional 
institutions. 
Thus, social confidence in the democratic government and political 
institutions are strongly associated with each other. Social trust can help build 
effective institutions which consolidate into well-performing governments 
and this, in turn, encourages confidence in constitutional institutions. 126 
                                                 
122  See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. ET AL., WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT (1997); PIPPA 
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Performance?, in DISAFFECTED DEMOCRACIES, supra note 126, at 178. 
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Conversely, complex social tendencies and institutional shortcomings may 
anticipate a progressive erosion of the trust in democratic institutions and 
constitutionalism.127 Remember the archetypal case of the Weimar Republic: 
the fall of constitutional democracy and the rise of totalitarianism.128 It is true 
that the economic calamity of the Great Depression proved fatal for the 
constitutional democracy in Germany. But the consequences of the Versailles 
Treaty, internal threats from political extremists, and failed cooperation of 
moderate political parties also played a role in the fall of the Weimar 
Constitution. 129  The political institutions were unable to deal with the 
economic, social, and political crisis. 
Similar schemes seem to work worldwide today. Putin’s and Erdogan’s 
dominance in Russia and Turkey respectively are the consequence of distrust 
towards political institutions. Both leaders pulled off the customary trick of 
offering a solution to instability largely of their own making. Authoritarians 
usually point to different signs of crisis justifying a popular mandate in their 
favor to deal with the issue unboundedly. 130  As a result, the Parliament 
changes the constitution and apex courts alter the reading of the constitutional 
text to support an executive president with increased powers.131 Similarities 
can be detected in many other countries, notably Hungary, where populist 
authoritarianism has triumphed over constitutional democracy. The rather 
rosy story of post-communist constitutional transformation has been gradually 
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spoiled. During a period of decline, observers of Hungarian politics and law 
have witnessed a cold civil war characterized by paralyzed legal institutions 
and distrust towards the old constitution. Several empirical studies have 
revealed that an overwhelming majority of the Hungarian society distrusted 
legal institutions such as the Parliament, governmental bodies, and courts.132 
According to a comparative survey, two decades after 1989, the “annus 
mirabilis,” seventy-seven percent of Hungarians were dissatisfied with the 
way democracy was working in the country.133 Approval for changing from a 
single-party system to a democracy had decreased by eighteen percent.134 
Finally, the cold civil war ended in a landslide election victory for the political 
right, paving the way for the total transformation of the legal system that 
resulted in the adoption of the 2011 Fundamental Law and its amendments.135 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In sum, representative governments in several countries cannot cope 
with legal and extra-legal difficulties. Poor democratic traditions, weak civil 
society, and imperfect legal institutions may all make the constitutional 
systems vulnerable. When a representative government is paralyzed because 
of fundamental disagreement, and legal stability crumbles because of a 
disintegrating constitutional system, the public finds itself wishing for an 
effective and efficient executive. This path may lead towards populist 
authoritarianism. 
Contemporary tendencies show that the executive power may gain 
unrestrained power when a constitutional system fails to maintain the balance 
between trust in the legitimate government and the impulse to distrust it. A 
divergence from equilibrium can be a sign of populist authoritarianism. 
Although modern authoritarianism refers to principles and aims of 
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democracy, it introduces mechanisms that diverge from those of democratic 
institutions. When authoritarianism calls for a constitutional change so as to 
create a more dynamic and efficient executive, it is misusing constitutional 
institutions. The lesson may be that an effective and efficient government is 
impossible when only constitutional checks work and, conversely, an 
authoritarian executive may emerge when constitutional checks do not work 
at all. 
